choose actions. It will have to be implementable. If each of the components does its job successfully, and they are suitably mated, the resulting package is both (a) plausible as an account of what makes right acts right, and (b) useful as a guide to the selection of actions in real life.
For convenience in discussion, I will say that the actual principle of moral rightness is the "theoretical level principle" and I will say that the other item -the decision procedure or whatever it turns out to be -is the "practical level principle".
ii In any plausible Two-Levels view, the two components must be properly connected. For any selected theoretical level principle, there must be a certain practical level principle suitable for use by those who have accepted that theoretical level principle. The combination of that theoretical level principle and that practical level principle will make a coherent two-level theory in normative ethics.
CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY FOR PRACTICAL LEVEL PRINCIPLES
What features would make a practical level principle the appropriate match for a given theoretical level principle? I think the most intuitive way to proceed is to introduce a sample theoretical level principle, and then to describe the conditions that must be satisfied by a practical level principle if it is to be the appropriate partner for the selected theoretical level principle. Because it's so familiar, I will use a generic form of act utilitarianism as my sample theoretical level principle. The claims I make about the features of the associated practical level principle in this case will carry over pretty directly in other cases in which we start with a different theoretical level principle. In the final section of the paper, extensions to Rossianism and a form of virtue ethics are discussed.
According to act utilitarianism (AU), an act is morally right if and only if it maximizes utility. Classically, the utility of an act was understood to be the total amount of pleasure the act would cause, minus the total amount of pain it would cause. More plausible modern forms of act utilitarianism make use of more sophisticated assumptions about value.
iii But no matter what the details, it will turn out that no ordinary human being has the information he would need in order actually to use AU when in the real world trying to figure out what to do. iv 3
We seek one main feature in a theoretical level principle: it should state what we take to be the actual necessary and sufficient conditions for the absolute, objective moral rightness of actions. We do not insist that the principle be implementable.
Implementability is to be sought in the associated practical level principle. Can we say more about the features we seek in a practical level principle? I will describe five conditions that must be satisfied by a practical level principle if it is to be a suitable partner for AU as the theoretical level principle in a Two Level Theory.
v The first condition is:
a. Implementability: Suppose AU is my theoretical level principle. In some cases I don't know, and realize that I cannot figure out in any helpful way, which of my alternatives will lead to the best outcome. vi So I need some practical level principle that will offer guidance in this condition of irremediable ignorance. Obviously, in this situation, it would be pointless to turn to another principle if that other principle were just as hard to implement as AU. Thus, the associated practical level principle must be easier to implement.
To clarify this condition, let us consider some ways in which a practical level principle could fail to satisfy it. Consider this:
PLP1: When you cannot identify the act that is required according to the theoretical level principle that you accept, then perform the act that you would perform if you believed in that same principle and were omniscient.
The actions recommended by PLP1 in many ordinary cases would be good ones from the perspective of the agent's favored theoretical level principle. situation, he will be unable to identify the alternative that has the highest probability on his evidence of being the one that is required by his theoretical level principle. So he will be unable to implement PLP3.
An even deeper problem with PLP3 is that in some cases we may know for sure that some act is not permitted by our favored theoretical level principle, and yet in light of our ignorance, we may think that this is precisely the one that should be selected by 5 our practical level principle. A good example of this is provided by Frank Jackson's case involving Dr Jill and her delightful patient, John.
x John has a minor skin ailment. Three drugs -A, B, and C -are available for treatment. Dr Jill knows that A will be good enough but with some minor adverse side effects. Dr Jill also knows that one of B and C will yield a perfect cure; the other will kill John. But she does not know, and knows that she cannot figure out, which is the perfect cure and which is the killer drug. In this case
Dr Jill -a utilitarian --recognizes that she does not know which drug AU requires her to
give -it is either B or C, but she can't tell which.
In this sort of case (depending upon how the details are spelled out) it could be reasonable to seek a practical level principle that will direct Dr Jill to prescribe A -the "good enough" second best drug. But giving A is not permitted by AU; it is stipulated that Dr Jill knows that giving A will be less good than giving the perfect cure drug, which is B or C. So the probability that giving A is required by Dr Jill's theoretical level principle is zero. This shows that PLP3 is wrong. We sometimes think that morality requires us to fall back to a second-best action even though we know for sure that it is not permitted by our favored theoretical level principle.
Holly Smith has proposed another idea. xi Let's The second condition that we place on proposed practical level principles is this:
in order to be acceptable for a given agent, a practical level principle must not direct that agent to do something that will be morally repugnant from the perspective of the 7 theoretical level principle that he or she accepts. It has to recommend a course of action that will be at least "defensible" from the perspective of that principle. This is where the distinction between two levels of obligation may come in. xiii I will say that the theoretical level principle is intended to provide information about moral obligation in the first instance and that the practical level principle is intended to provide information about moral obligation in the second instance. I abbreviate these as "obligation1" and "obligation2".
Moral obligation1 is your obligation as determined by the correct theory of absolute moral obligation and the facts about how things stand objectively in the world; it is your moral obligation in the first instance. It is natural to think of this as a form of objective obligation. Moral obligation2 is your moral obligation in the second instance, or your "fall-back" obligation. If you are having trouble identifying the right action according to what you take to be the correct theory of moral obligation1, but you want to be a decent person, you want to avoid being morally blameworthy, you want to act at least in the spirit of the theory you believe, then you are probably trying to find out what is morally obligatory in the second instance. This sort of obligation is determined by how things appear from the perspective of the agent and so it is natural to think of it as a form of subjective obligation. do, but it will be about the best you can do given your unfortunate ignorance.
The third condition, then, is this: any acceptable practical level principle must give a moral recommendation for action; it must purport to say what morality requires2
of an agent as a back-up when that agent cannot identify the action that is morally obligatory1.
d. Ideally, if a practical level principle directs an agent to perform some action, then it should be possible for the agent to perform that action. There might seem to be something strange about a moral principle that recommends a certain course of action, when in fact the agent will not be able to act on that recommendation. How helpful is a back-up plan when in fact it can't be followed?
Perhaps surprisingly, I think that it would be a mistake to impose this condition in this very robust form. Recall that principles at the practical level are supposed to recommend courses of action that are subjectively obligatory. That is, they are supposed to point us toward actions based on how things seem to us rather than based on how things are objectively.
Suppose a utilitarian thinks -mistakenly, as it happens -that he has certain alternatives; suppose it seems to him that one of them would be the best one to perform; but suppose that one is in fact one that he cannot perform. I want to say that from the 9 subjective perspective of the agent, that alternative is obligatory2. Until he realizes that he can't do it, that's the one that he ought2 to aim for. As soon as he realizes that he can't do it, something else will become his obligation2.
So while we cannot endorse an objective version of the "ought implies can" principle for practical level obligation, we can endorse a subjective version of that principle: if, as of some time, t, an agent, S, has a practical level obligation to perform an act, a, then, as of t, S must think that a is one of his alternatives. An acceptable practical level principle should be consistent with this condition, too.
e . An adequate practical level principle must provide a way for the agent to avoid at least certain sorts of blame. xv In some cases, a person is blameworthy for having done a certain act largely because he really could have done better; out of laziness, or selfishness, or lack of concern with morality, he just took the easier or more selfish path.
Any of these conditions may make the person blameworthy. A conscientious person would want to be able to avoid that sort of blame. This is where practical level principles
In a case in which a person accepts a certain theoretical level principle, but realizes that he cannot get the information he needs in order to fulfill its recommendation, he may want a back-up principle that will direct him to a course of action such that if he does it, he will be able to defend himself against accusations of laziness, or selfishness, or lack of concern with morality. He will be able to say that it was impossible, at the time, for him to get the information he needed in order to identify in a helpful way the act that was really obligatory1; so, out of a concern for morality, and in an attempt to do the best he could under the circumstances, he fell back upon his practical level principle and did what it declared to be obligatory2. Where this sort of response is appropriately in place, blame of the sort envisioned is evaded.
xvii So the final condition concerning practical level principles is this: they should
give recommendations for action such that, if the agent successfully acts on those recommendations, he will not be open to blame of the sorts described here.
A FANTASTIC DIGRESSION
Suppose a conscientious moral agent believes in a form of act utilitarianism and wants to do the right thing. Suppose also that this agent recognizes that she does not know the things she would need to know in order to apply the theory to her present predicament.
She is morally perplexed. But suppose in addition that this agent has the opportunity to consult with a Utilitarian Moral Guide. The guide is a clear thinker who fully understands the workings of AU; he does not have any factual information beyond that available to the agent. Nevertheless, he is willing to help.
Let's assume that the perplexed utilitarian is Dr Jill (from the Jackson example). She explains her perplexity to the Utilitarian Moral Guide. The guide insists at the outset that Dr Jill describe her alternatives in helpful, action-guiding terminology. Thus he says, 'When you tell me about what you take to be your alternatives, be sure to describe each alternative in such a way that, if you subsequently decide that it is the one you should do, you will have no epistemic trouble about implementing your decision.' Dr Jill then explains her alternatives (Pills A, B, and C) and she goes on to say that she wants to give her patient, John, the utility maximizing treatment. Her problem is that she cannot get the information that would enable her to determine in a helpful way which of the three available prescriptions in fact would maximize utility. She is certain that pill A will give John a pretty good but less than ideal cure. She believes that one of B and C is a perfect cure pill that would lead to a much better outcome, and the other of B and C is a killer drug that would lead to a much worse outcome. Her problem is that she doesn't know which is the cure and which is the killer. Suppose Dr Jill responds by saying that she thinks it would be morally wrong in this particular case to put John at serious risk of death unless it is absolutely necessary to save his life.
The Utilitarian Moral Guide then makes his recommendation. He says: 'Among the things that you take to be your alternatives, throw out all the ones that seem to you to involve exposing John to unwarranted risk of death. Then, among the remaining alternatives, select the one that seems to you to be best. Do that. (Or if several of your remaining alternatives seem to be tied for first place, then just pick one of them at random and do it.)' So in this example (which I will call "Case A"), the Utilitarian Moral Guide recommends that Dr Jill give Pill A.
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Note that the act selected in Case A is not the act that maximizes actual utility. As a result, it should be clear that the policy behind the Utilitarian Moral Guide's recommendation is not equivalent to AU. Nor is the policy behind the Moral Guide's recommendation equivalent to the idea that the Perplexed Agent should just go ahead and do whatever seems best. In this case, giving Pill A does not seem best to Dr Jill. It seems to her that giving A is second best, and that either giving B or giving C would be best;
she just doesn't know whether it's B or whether it's C.
We should also note something about expected utility. We can make some further comments on the dialogue by considering the extent to which the recommendation given by the Moral Guide satisfies the conditions that I stated earlier.
Condition (a):
Helpfulness. The recommendation given in this case by the moral guide satisfies the helpfulness condition. It tells Dr Jill which pill she should2 give and it gives her this recommendation in terminology that will make it easy for her to figure out what she is supposed2 to do. This must be the case since it is stipulated that when Dr Jill initially asked for assistance, she was required to describe her alternatives in terms that would subsequently be helpful to her. When she gets her recommendation, it will have to specify one or more of those alternatives, described in precisely those helpful terms that she herself provided at the outset. Let me now state my general conclusion about this example: the recommendation given by the Utilitarian Moral Guide is plausible. In fact it does seem that Dr Jill's fallback obligation2 in this case is to give Pill A. She will be able to adopt the Guide's recommendation, and she will retain her status as a morally conscientious person if she does so. While some might want to blame her for being in such a pickle in the first place, no one could reasonably blame her for following the Guide's advice when in the situation 13 as described. By following that advice, she would be doing the best she could given her ignorance of some morally relevant information.
SOME VARIATIONS ON THE THEME
Now let us turn to some examples that illustrate what happens when the agent is in slightly different subjective situations. Imagine that the dialogue in Case B starts out just like the dialogue in Case A. Dr Jill has the same patient, the same set of drugs, the same troubling lack of information about the merits of B and C. But when the utilitarian guide gets to the part about the morality of risk, the discussion takes a different turn: So in Case B, the Guide recommends that Dr Jill ought2 to give either B or C.
The distinctive feature of Case B is Dr Jill's view about the morality of risk. Here, as before, she thinks morality requires1 her to aim for the best outcome. The distinctive feature in this case is this: when Dr Jill reflects on the amounts of harm and benefit that might result from the different courses of action that she takes to be available, she thinks morality calls upon her to expose her patient to this particular risk in order to achieve the 14 best possible result. She thinks that this is what she has to do as a conscientious person.
Given that she has these moral views, it's permissible2 for her to give B or C.
Maybe she shouldn't have those views. Maybe she should be more risk averseespecially when it is John who is going to be exposed to that risk. But she isn't. She thinks it's worth the risk even though there's no certainty of a complete cure. I do not have these views about risk, but given that she sincerely does, it seems permissible2 for her to act on them. Perhaps it was not permissible1 for her to have allowed herself to have those views. However, in the present instance we are evaluating her actions based on her current mental state; we are not evaluating the processes by which she got into her current mental state.
Let us now turn to another sort of case.
In Case C, Dr Jill doesn't have any idea of the utility of any alternative. Nor does she have any views about relative magnitudes of the utility differences between alternatives. However, she thinks she has certain alternatives; and among these there are some that she thinks would be better than others. She has no views about the extents to which the different alternatives would put people at risk of serious harm. After eliciting this information, the Utilitarian Moral Guide recommends that Dr Jill pick at random among the ones she thinks might be best.
Case C is intended to highlight an important difference between my approach and some other popular approaches. Note that in Case C, Dr Jill does not have any beliefs about the mathematical features of the case, aside from the fact there are certain alternatives that (as she sees it) would lead to better consequences than others. Thus, it would be pointless for the Utilitarian Guide to recommend that Dr Jill perform the act that maximizes utility, or the act that maximizes expected utility, or the act that she thinks will maximize utility or expected utility -for in this case there are no acts about which Dr Jill has any such beliefs. Given her very limited information, the best recommendation the Guide can give is just to choose an alternative that, as she sees it, might be among the best available. I think that if Dr Jill follows this advice, she will be in the clear morally.
She will have done something permissible2. focusing the agent's thoughts on the considerations that are relevant in her perplexity.
A TWO-LEVEL MORAL THEORY
In every case, the Utilitarian Moral Guide's recommendation would be consistent with certain policies:
1. If the agent is convinced that certain alternatives are better than others, then other things being equal, the Utilitarian Moral Guide would recommend that she perform one of the ones the agent takes to be among the best available.
2. If the agent doesn't have an actual ranking of alternatives, but thinks that some alternatives are riskier than others, and thinks that in the case at hand morality requires her to avoid putting people at risk of harm, and believes that there are alternatives that would avoid putting anyone at serious risk of serious harm, then, other things being equal, the Utilitarian Moral Guide would recommend that she perform one of the ones she takes to be less risky.
3. Where the implications of (1) seem to conflict with the implications of (2), the Utilitarian Moral Guide would try to elicit from the agent some indication of her feelings in her current case of the relative moral importance of doing what's best versus avoiding risk. He will recommend that the agent abide by the policy that she thinks is more important in the present instance.
If the perplexed agent has no clue about the values of alternatives, then the
Utilitarian Moral Guide would recommend that the agent pick at random.
We might think that the Two-Level Theory suggested by these fantastical reflections would be something like this:
Level 1: You morally ought1 to perform an act iff it maximizes utility. Fortunately, all this talk of the Utilitarian Moral Guide is mere heuristic and can be eliminated. In order to state the actual view without resorting to fantasy, we must describe a decision procedure that the perplexed agent can follow on her own, without the help of a Moral Guide. Since the agent under consideration here is a utilitarian, she would need a Utilitarian Decision Procedure. It goes like this
Step One: consider the acts that you take to be your alternatives -described in "helpful", "action-guiding" terms xxi ;
Step Two: consider, insofar as your epistemic state permits, what you take to be their values or perhaps just their relative values xxii ;
Step Three: if you haven't got useful information about the actual values of your alternatives, then consider how your views about the morality of risk apply to your present situation; and, in light of all this,
Step Four: identify the acts in this particular case that seem most nearly consistent with the general policy of maximizing utility where possible while avoiding things that put people at excessive risk of serious harm; and then;
Step Five: perform one of them.
Conscientious use of this decision procedure would yield a conclusion about what should2 be done. The procedure constitutes moral guidance rather than etiquettical or legal or prudential guidance; even if the resulting guidance would not be equivalent to the implications of act utilitarianism, it would not be morally repugnant from the perspective of a utilitarian. The guidance would emerge in helpful terms, so that the agent would know how to perform the designated act; the agent would at least think that she will be able to perform the recommended action; and if the agent were legitimately unable to determine the implications of act utilitarianism for his current situation, and were to make use of and then act upon the output of this decision procedure, he would not be open to moral blame in the specified ways. Hence, this proposal satisfies many of the conditions laid out at the outset -or at any rate versions of those conditions.
With all this in place, I can now state a Two-Level Theory with AU at the first level:
Level 1: You morally ought1 to perform an act iff it maximizes utility.
Level 2: If you cannot determine what you morally ought1 to do, then you morally ought2 to perform an act iff it is an outcome of the Utilitarian Decision Procedure.
EXTENSIONS TO ROSSIANISM AND VIRTUE ETHICS
According to the normative theory of Sir William David Ross (as presented in The Right and the Good) an action is morally right iff it maximizes net prima facie rightness.
Ross thinks that there are certain features of actions that tend to make those actions morally right. Among these he lists being the keeping of a promise, being a case of justly distributing some good or evil, being a case of showing gratitude, being a case of making reparations for a past misdeed, being a case of conferring a benefit on someone. These are the prima facie right making characteristics. An act can have one or more of these, or it can have none. For each such characteristic, an act can have it to a great extent, or to a smaller extent. We can give each act a score indicating the total extent to which it has each of the prima facie rightmaking characteristics. We can sum these extents. We can call that the act's "pfrightness".
The same is true with respect to prima facie wrongmaking characteristics. We can call the sum of these in any case the act's "pfwrongness".
If you subtract an act's pfwrongness from its pfrightness, you get its net In many cases they do not know which, among their alternatives has more net pfrightness than the others. So they are in an epistemic pickle.
We can As before, all this talk of moral guides is mere heuristic. It can be eliminated.
According to the non-fantastical version of the theory, if an agent accepts Ross's theory, he will think that his moral obligation in the first instance is to perform an act that maximizes net pfrightness. When he cannot figure out what act that is, he may fall back to his moral obligation in the second instance. That act will be the output of the Rossian Decision Theory. The Rossian Decision Theory will be structurally just like the Utilitarian Decision Theory described above in Section 5, but with the obvious substitution of the Rossian concepts for the utilitarian concepts.
According to another theory in the normative ethics of behavior, actions should be evaluated by appeal to the amounts of virtue and vice that the agent would manifest in performing them. Thus, for example, suppose someone has a chance to save a baby from a burning building. If he rushes in and pulls out the baby, his action will manifest a lot of courage. It will also manifest a certain amount of benevolence. If these are virtues, then the act gets some positive points for manifesting these virtues. The precise number of points would be determined by the precise magnitudes of the virtues being manifested.
An act that manifests great courage would get more points for that than would an act that manifests just a tiny bit of courage.
Suppose someone has a chance to skulk away and avoid getting involved in saving anyone from a fire. Suppose he does this because he is afraid of getting injured.
Then his act manifests the vice of cowardice. As a result, the act gets some negative points for manifesting this vice. The precise number of points would be determined by the precise amount of cowardice being manifested.
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Suppose we have a list of all the virtues and vices. Suppose we have a way of determining, for each possible action, how much virtue it would manifest and how much vice it would manifest. Assume that these amounts can be represented numerically. We could then subtract the total amount of vice that would be manifested by some possible action from the total amount of virtue that would be manifested by it. The result is the VV Quotient of the action. To say that an act maximizes this value is to say that no alternative has greater VV Quotient than it has.
A plausible form of Virtue Ethics then says:
VE: An act is morally right iff it maximizes VV Quotient. gives the correct account of moral obligation1.
As in the cases of Act Utilitarianism and Rossianism, all mention of the moral guide can be eliminated. If a person believes in Virtue Ethics, he will think that his obligation in the first instance is always to do the act that maximizes VV Quotient; his obligation in the second instance is to perform an act that is the outcome of the Virtue Ethical Decision Procedure. Although there is not sufficient space to explain it here, my view is that the answer given in the Rossian case as well as in the Virtue Ethical case would be consistent with the conditions that I outlined earlier.
The Two-Level structure that I have described can be extended so as to apply to various forms of Kantianism, Rights Theory, and other views in the normative ethics of behavior. I leave it to the interested reader to work out the details. xxiv ffeldman@philos.umass.edu 22 i 'There is therefore much truth in the description of the right act as a fortunate act. If we cannot be certain that it is right, it is our good fortune if the act we do is the right act.' W.
D. Ross, The Right and the Good, (Oxford, 1930) , p. 31.
ii Others have used other terminology here. Some have described the first thing as the principle of "objective obligation" and the second thing as the principle of "subjective obligation". Hare used the terms "critical level principle" and "intuitive level principle" in a closely related way. I have no objection to any terminology here. After all, they are just names.
iii I have defended a variant in which right acts are said to maximize "desert adjusted"
utility. Mason suggests that she means to defend an answer along these lines. In one place she says that when you don't know what you should do, you should try to maximize utility.
She goes on to say, 'An agent counts as trying to maximize utility when she does what she believes will maximize utility.' (p. 324).
viii Suppose we say that the agent's alternatives are "doing what will be best" and "doing something that will be less than the best". ix There are passages in Mason, 'Consequentialism', in which she seems to endorse this approach, too. See, for example, p. 323 where she says '…whenever we are given an instruction like [maximize the good], we ought to figure out which course of action is most likely to fulfill the instruction, and pursue that course of action.'
